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NEAR Intents exploit: $3.8M drained a week after it blocked $50M of Bitget funds

On Oct 1, 2026 NEAR Intents lost about $3.8M through a bug between its Omni deposit and withdrawal system and its contract. What happened and what it means.

by Milan Vosspublished updated 5 min readincidentcross-chainNEAR Intents

≈ $3.8Mpreliminary loss, BNB Chain hot walletteam statement · 1 Oct
11 chainsdeposits and withdrawals paused ≈ 12 more hoursstatus page · 1 Oct
$50M+Bitget funds its screening layer refused a week earlierteam statement

What happened

NEAR Intents lets you swap a token on one blockchain for a token on another. Users state what they want — an intent — and solvers fill it, with assets moving in and out through the Omni deposit and withdrawal infrastructure and its hot wallets.

time (UTC, Oct 1, 2026) event
morning NEAR Intents’ status page opens incidents for its HOT bridge and for deposits and withdrawals on BNB Smart Chain, Avalanche, Optimism, Polygon, TON, Stellar, Scroll, Plasma, ADI, X Layer and, later, Monad — about 5–7 hours before 13:00 UTC.
~13:00 ZachXBT reports irregular outflows from NEAR Intents’ BSC hot wallet 0x233c…, which then stops processing transactions. Funds go to KuCoin and are bridged to Bitcoin. BSC theft address: 0x09fd1f5d9f185067a92493e43aa259ea4ab3ad37.
afternoon NEAR Intents confirms the incident: a bug in the Omni infrastructure’s interaction with its contract, about $3.8M lost, the contract flaw patched, core services back within about an hour, 11 chains paused for about 12 more hours, full compensation, law enforcement notified.
Oct 2 The team says it has identified the attacker and posts return addresses with a 48-hour deadline. The funds come back in full the same day; a BNB Chain transaction carries the message “We’ve returned all the funds, we were in the wrong”, and the team closes its investigation (Cointelegraph, Unchained).

We read the status page ourselves on October 1. Ethereum, Solana and NEAR were not among the chains with open incidents at that point.

What is known — and what is not

Known: the loss is a preliminary figure of about $3.8 million; the cause is described as a bug between the Omni deposit/withdrawal infrastructure and the NEAR Intents contract; the BSC hot wallet was drained; the funds moved to KuCoin and on to Bitcoin; on October 2 the attacker returned the full amount after the team said it had identified them.

Not known: the exact mechanism, whether other hot wallets lost funds, who the attacker is and how the team identified them (neither executive has said), why they returned the money, and whether KuCoin froze anything. NEAR Intents promised a post-mortem in the coming days; we could not find it published as of October 8, and we will update this article when it is out.

The irony that is not a contradiction

A week before its own exploit, NEAR Intents was the protocol that said no to the Bitget hackers: its screening layer, SHIELD, rejected more than $50 million in attempted transfers. Some commentators now point at the gap.

It is worth being precise. Screening decides whose money a protocol accepts. Security is whether the protocol’s own contracts, bridges and hot wallets can be tricked. A protocol can be strict at the door and still have a bug in the wiring — as NEAR Intents now says it had.

Three incidents, three kinds of failure

Chainflip (Sept 12) Bitget (Sept 24) NEAR Intents (Oct 1)
What it is Cross-chain swap protocol Centralized exchange with KYC Cross-chain intents protocol
Loss 736,442 USDT about $387.5M about $3.8M (preliminary)
Weak point How it read TRON memos after signing Internal approval system, reached via a zero-day in third-party software Interaction between its Omni deposit/withdrawal infrastructure and its contract
Keys stolen? No No Not reported
Who carries the loss TRON USDT liquidity providers (repayment pending) Bitget’s protection fund Returned by the attacker (Oct 2)

In all three, the keys were not the problem. The failures were in the code that decides when and how funds move. Our earlier analyses: Chainflip’s TRON memo exploit and the Bitget hack.

What it means if you swap without KYC

  • Check the status page before you deposit. NEAR Intents publishes one per chain; so do many protocols. An open incident on your chain means wait.
  • Assets “inside” a protocol are not in your wallet. If you hold balances in NEAR Intents — directly, through HOT Wallet or near.com — they depend on the protocol’s hot wallets and bridges.
  • Prefer routes that settle to your own wallet quickly, and set a refund address where the interface allows it.
  • Screening and security are separate questions. Our catalog labels screening for every service; incidents like this one are recorded separately, with sources, on each service’s page.

Frequently asked questions

How much was stolen from NEAR Intents? About $3.8 million, according to the team’s preliminary report on October 1, 2026. The figure may change when the full technical report is published.

What caused the NEAR Intents exploit? The team says it was a bug in how its Omni deposit and withdrawal infrastructure interacted with the NEAR Intents smart contract. Investigator ZachXBT reported irregular outflows from its BNB Chain hot wallet. Technical details have not been published yet.

Was the stolen money returned? Yes. On October 2 the team said it had identified the attacker and set a 48-hour deadline; the funds were returned in full within about a day, and the team closed its investigation. NEAR Intents had also pledged to compensate affected users in full.

Is it safe to use NEAR Intents now? The team says the contract flaw is patched. Deposits and withdrawals on 11 chains stayed paused for about 12 more hours after the core service returned on October 1. Check its status page before you deposit. The team promised a post-mortem; we could not find it published as of October 8, so wait for it if you move large amounts.

Isn’t NEAR Intents the protocol that blocked Bitget’s stolen funds? Yes. A week earlier its screening layer, SHIELD, rejected more than $50 million in transfers linked to the Bitget hack. Screening decides who may use a protocol; it does not protect the protocol’s own code and wallets.

Sources

First written on the day of the incident; updated on October 8, 2026 with the return of the funds. It will be updated again when NEAR Intents publishes its post-mortem.