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The 1984 ehf breach: Feather Wallet and RoboSats are offline, Wagyu's XMR1 collapsed — what to check now

On 20 November 2026 the Icelandic host 1984 ehf stopped all services after a serious cyberattack, reported jointly with CERT-IS. Feather Wallet's download site and RoboSats' site and official onion client, hosted there, went offline — Feather amid unconfirmed claims of a tampered Windows build; Wagyu said its XMR1 issuing key leaked through the same breach, and XMR1 lost 99.8% of its price. What is confirmed, what is not, and what to check.

by Milan Vosspublished 4 min readincidentsprivacymonero

1984 ehf is a small Icelandic host known for its free-speech and privacy stance, popular with privacy projects. On Friday 20 November it went dark. Three projects that people in our niche use daily depended on it, and all three were hit the same day in different ways.

What is confirmed

Around 11:00 UTC 1984 ehf and CERT-IS, Iceland’s national cyber-security team, announced a large and serious attack on the company’s IT infrastructure. The first findings point to a well-organised, technically advanced attack; its full scope is still being investigated and more systems may be affected than confirmed so far. 1984 stopped all its services. DNS and e-mail are expected back first, under special monitoring; everything else only after security checks. Icelandic outlets DV, MBL and Viðskiptablaðið reported it.

Feather Wallet: the download site is down

Feather is a popular open-source Monero desktop wallet. Its site featherwallet.org resolves to an address in 1984’s network (AS44925), and in our checks it has been unreachable since about noon UTC.

Posts on r/Monero and Nostr claim that the Windows 2.9.1 standalone build offered on the site had been replaced with a trojan. This is not confirmed. Two facts matter here:

  • 2.9.1, released on 2 November, dropped Windows code signing — the developer said signing had not reduced antivirus false positives — so antivirus alerts on that build were common even before the breach;
  • with the host breached, tampering with files on the web server cannot be ruled out either.

What to do: do not run a Feather installer downloaded from the site in recent days without checking it. Download only from the GitHub releases of feather-wallet/feather and verify the GPG signature against the release key 8185 E158 A333 30C7 FD61 BC0D 1F76 E155 CEFB A71C; Feather’s builds are reproducible, so the hashes can also be compared with independent builds. If you already ran an unchecked Windows build and it held funds, move them from a clean machine to a new wallet.

The wallet itself — its code and your keys — is not affected by a breach of the download host. That is why our status for Feather is caution, about the download path, not avoid.

RoboSats: the site and the official onion client are down

RoboSats is a peer-to-peer Bitcoin exchange over Lightning, run as a federation of independent coordinators. Its site robosats.org — including learn.robosats.org and unsafe.robosats.org — resolves to 1984’s network (AS44925). In our checks both robosats.org and the official onion client have been unreachable since 11:21 UTC, after 136 successful checks earlier in the day; the domain robosats.com, on a different network, still answers.

What we cannot see from outside is the state of the coordinators themselves and of trades already in progress; RoboSats has not published a statement we could find. If you have an open order, keep your order token and the coordinator’s name, and follow the coordinator’s own channels rather than links that appear in the meantime.

Wagyu: the XMR1 key

Wagyu is the no-KYC bridge whose token XMR1 represents Monero on Hyperliquid. A Wagyu team member said the key that issues XMR1 had been kept on an old, deleted server and that logs and files from it leaked when 1984 was breached. On 20 November XMR1 fell from 508 USDC the day before to about 0.87 USDC. From 04:46:58 UTC the address that issued XMR1 sent 5.2 million XMR1 of its reserve, in three transfers, to one new address. That address started selling at 04:49 and sold about 373,000 XMR1 for about 12.97 million USDC before the price reached 1 USDC, then moved about 13.3 million USDC off Hyperliquid’s trading layer. It still holds about 4.8 million XMR1. No new XMR1 was minted. Who controlled the issuing key at that moment the on-chain data cannot tell. Reports put about 7,400 ETH, roughly $13.5M, bridged out to Ethereum. Wagyu promised to compensate users and to come back online.

Others question the timeline. On-chain, the first reserve transfer is at 04:46:58 UTC; 1984’s announcement came around 11:00 UTC, and it does not mention customer data or Wagyu. The timing alone does not tell who held the key. We cannot settle that; we record both and wait for evidence — on-chain refunds or a technical post-mortem.

This is the same XMR1 that the Lighter and Safe thieves bought on 16–17 November; we describe that in a separate article.

What this says about hosting and keys

  • One host can be a single point of failure for very different projects: a wallet’s download site, a P2P exchange’s front end and a bridge’s signing key.
  • Download sites are the weak spot of open-source wallets. Signed releases and reproducible builds exist so that you do not have to trust the site — but only if you check them.
  • A key that controls a token people treat as money should never sit on a server, deleted or not.

Sources: 1984 ehf and CERT-IS joint statement as reported by DV, MBL and Viðskiptablaðið (20 Nov 2026); Feather 2.9.1 release notes on GitHub; Foresight News on Wagyu; the Hyperliquid info API (XMR1 token details and prices, 20 Nov 15:3x UTC); our uptime checks (Feather, RoboSats).