Two thefts, one route: how the Lighter and Safe thieves routed stolen funds into Wagyu's XMR1 — and how that token collapsed
On 16 November 2026 two unrelated thefts — about $10.4M from a Lighter trading account and about $6.43M from a Safe multisig — were routed the same way: bridged to Arbitrum, deposited to Hyperliquid and swapped into XMR1, Wagyu's Monero token. Our on-chain tracking, our two warnings to Wagyu, and what happened when XMR1 lost 99.8% of its price four days later.
On Monday 16 November two thefts happened a few hours apart. They had nothing to do with each other: one hit a trading account on the perpetuals exchange Lighter, the other a Safe multisig wallet. By the evening money from both was moving along the same path into the same token — XMR1, the Monero wrapper of the no-KYC bridge Wagyu on Hyperliquid. This is what we saw, what we did about it, and why that exit stopped working four days later.
The two thefts
Lighter. At 10:11 UTC a single transaction withdrew 10,393,056.79 USDC from one trading account to a fresh address. Lighter paused withdrawals and said a leaked API key of that trader’s account was used; its contracts were not affected. Researchers spoke of about $15.5M across two accounts; on-chain we see the $10.4M withdrawal. Lighter later said about $5M was returned.
Safe. At 11:35 UTC one transaction moved about $6.43M — 4.39M USDC and 1.72M syrupUSDC — out of a Safe multisig through its Zodiac Roles module: a member key of a role appears to have been compromised, and the role allowed the transfer. The multisig contract itself was not broken. The security firm Specter flagged it first; news sites followed three to four hours later.
One route
Both thieves did the same three things:
- bridged to Arbitrum (LI.FI, LayerSwap, Across);
- deposited USDC to Hyperliquid, each through a set of fresh accounts — twelve on the Lighter side, ten on the Safe side;
- bought XMR1 on the spot pair @260, which Hyperliquid itself names «XMR - Wagyu.xyz». XMR1 can only be turned into native Monero through Wagyu.
Not everything went that way. The Lighter thief also sent about 420 ETH through THORChain and 10 ETH through Tornado Cash, and still held about 3,400 ETH on 16 November.
On the evening of 16 November the 22 accounts held 9,791.32 XMR1, about $4.88M at the time. On 17 November two more accounts, both funded through the same intermediate address of the Safe theft, sent 8,000.74 XMR1 (about $4M) in 24 transfers between 05:16 and 13:40 UTC, each to a new address — the pattern of one address per redemption order. Our second letter at 09:58 listed the first 18 (5,530.60 XMR1). That is our reading; only Wagyu can say for sure.
What we did
Our detector opened a case on the Lighter theft at 11:35 UTC, half an hour after Lookonchain’s post, and followed the funds. It did not see the Safe theft at all — none of our sources carried it. We added the case by hand and have since added more sources and a red alert for the moment stolen money reaches a service in our catalog.
Because the money ended in a token only Wagyu could redeem, we wrote to Wagyu’s compliance address twice — on 16 November at 22:33 UTC with all 22 accounts and the theft transactions, and on 17 November at 09:58 UTC with the 18 new transfers. We asked for nothing for ourselves, and asked two questions: does Wagyu act on addresses like these, and may we quote its answer. We have had no answer. The full lists are in our case files; every figure can be checked on the Hyperliquid info API.
Four days later: the exit collapsed
On 20 November XMR1 fell from 508 USDC to about 0.87 USDC. From 04:46:58 UTC the address that issued XMR1 sent 5.2 million XMR1 of its reserve, in three transfers, to one new address. That address started selling at 04:49 and sold about 373,000 XMR1 for about 12.97 million USDC before the price reached 1 USDC, then moved about 13.3 million USDC off Hyperliquid’s trading layer. It still holds about 4.8 million XMR1. No new XMR1 was minted. Who controlled the issuing key at that moment the on-chain data cannot tell. A Wagyu team member said the issuing key had been kept on an old, deleted server and leaked when the Icelandic host 1984 ehf was breached the same day; he promised to compensate users and to relaunch. We cover that breach in a separate article.
For the thieves this means the 9,791.32 XMR1 still sitting in their 22 accounts — never redeemed, bought for about $5.06 million — is now worth about $8,000. For ordinary Wagyu users who held XMR1 it means a loss unless the promised compensation arrives.
What it means if you swap without KYC
- A token that only one service can redeem is that service’s promise, not the coin. XMR1 was not Monero; it was a claim on Wagyu.
- Thieves use the same doors you do. When a route becomes the favourite exit for stolen money, honest users of that route meet more checks, holds and, as here, the fallout of the service’s own security.
- If you hold a wrapped privacy coin, check who can mint it and who holds the reserve. Here a single key was enough, by the team’s own account, to break the token.
Sources: Lighter’s statements and post-mortem; Specter; Cointelegraph, CoinGape, Basis Desk; Foresight News; our on-chain tracking (cases 99 and 103) and the Hyperliquid info API (balances, transfers, token details, prices), 16–20 November 2026.